Volume 8, Issue 30 (3-2018)                   jemr 2018, 8(30): 7-42 | Back to browse issues page

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Amiri H, Samadian F. The Impact of Political Cycles on Construction Projects: A Case Study of Provinces in Iran. jemr. 2018; 8 (30) :7-42
URL: http://jemr.khu.ac.ir/article-1-1604-en.html
Abstract:   (544 Views)
Construction projects are the basic requirements of sustainable development and growth. Inefficient procedures of implementing the construction projects, regardless of our financial and administrative capacities, has imposed a large amount of unfinished and occasionally stopped projects to national economy. Since there are various components that affect the fate of projects, therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to answer this question that whether the political cycles affect the adoption and implementation of provincial construction projects or not? In order to answer this question, two hypotheses are considered in this paper. Therefore, GMM dynamic method was used to estimate the model and test hypothesis in the years 1997-2014. Hypothesis one: political cycles affect the fate of construction projects, and the second hypothesis: the impact of political cycles on the adoption and implementation of construction projects are larger in the year prior to political cycle (election). Therefore, in order to estimate the model and test the research hypothesis, provincial data during the years was used. Results of testing two hypotheses suggest that parliamentary and presidential political cycles have a significant positive correlation with the construction projects. Results also show that the presidential political cycle has a larger impact on construction projects, meaning that the impact of political cycles on the process of adopting and implementing the construction projects in the year prior to the political cycle is larger. In this regard, in order to eliminate the impacts of the governmental and parliamentary political cycle on construction projects, it is recommended to determine a competent authority that has the necessary qualifications as well as the sufficient degree of independence and supervision power over the project's Feasibility studies. The referenced mentioned will be approve projects based on objective justification-technical and district-based studies and it prevents the adoption of development plans based on the political considerations of the government and parliamentarians.
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Type of Study: Applicable | Subject: بخش عمومی
Received: 2017/06/11 | Accepted: 2017/12/20 | Published: 2018/03/6

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